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Abstract
In the last couple of years, several adversar-
ial attack methods based on different threat
models have been proposed for the image
classification problem. Most existing de-
fenses consider additive threat models in
which sample perturbations have bounded
Lp norms. These defenses, however, can be
vulnerable against adversarial attacks under
non-additive threat models. An example of
an attack method based on a non-additive
threat model is the Wasserstein adversar-
ial attack proposed by Wong et al. (2019),
where the distance between an image and
its adversarial example is determined by the
Wasserstein metric (“earth-mover distance”)
between their normalized pixel intensities.
Until now, there has been no certifiable de-
fense against this type of attack. In this
work, we propose the first defense with cer-
tified robustness against Wasserstein Adver-
sarial attacks using randomized smoothing.
We develop this certificate by considering the
space of possible flows between images, and
representing this space such that Wasserstein
distance between images is upper-bounded
by L1 distance in this flow-space. We can
then apply existing randomized smoothing
certificates for the L1 metric. In MNIST
and CIFAR-10 datasets, we find that our
proposed defense is also practically effective,
demonstrating significantly improved accu-
racy under Wasserstein adversarial attack
compared to unprotected models.
Preprint.
1 Introduction
In recent years, adversarial attacks against machine
learning systems, and defenses against these attacks,
have been heavily studied (Szegedy et al., 2013; Madry
et al., 2017; Carlini and Wagner, 2017). Although
these attacks have been applied in a variety of do-
mains, image classification tasks remain a major focus
of research. In general, for a specified image classifier
f , the goal of an adversarial attack on an image x is
to produce a perturbed image x˜ that is imperceptibly
‘close’ to x, such that f classifies x˜ differently than x.
This ‘closeness’ notion can be measured in a variety
of different ways under different threat models. Most
existing attacks and defenses consider additive threat
models where the Lp norm of x˜ −x is bounded.
Recently, non-additive threat models (Wong et al.,
2019; Laidlaw and Feizi, 2019; Engstrom et al., 2019;
Assion et al., 2019) have been introduced which aim
to minimize the distance between x and x˜ accord-
ing to other metrics. Among these attacks is the at-
tack introduced by Wong et al. (2019) which considers
the Wasserstein distance between x and x˜, normal-
ized such that the pixel intensities of the image can
be treated as probability distributions. Informally, the
Wasserstein distance between probability distributions
x and x˜ measures the minimum cost to ‘transport’
probability mass in order to transform x into x˜, where
the cost scales with both the amount of mass trans-
ported and the distance over which it is transported
with respect to some underlying metric. The intuition
behind this threat model is that shifting pixel inten-
sity a short distance across an image is less percepti-
ble than moving the same amount of pixel intensity
a larger distance (See Figure 1 for an example of a
Wasserstein adversarial attack.)
A variety of practical approaches have been proposed
to make classifiers robust against adversarial attack in-
cluding adversarial training (Madry et al., 2017), de-
fensive distillation (Papernot et al., 2016), and obfus-
cated gradients (Papernot et al., 2017). However, as
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Figure 1: An illustration of Wasserstein adversarial
attack (Wong et al., 2019).
new defenses are proposed, new attack methodologies
are often rapidly developed which defeat these defences
(Trame`r et al., 2017; Athalye et al., 2018; Carlini and
Wagner, 2016). While updated defences are often then
proposed (Trame`r et al., 2017), in general, we cannot
be confident that new attacks will not in turn defeat
these defences.
To escape this cycle, approaches have been proposed to
develop certifiably robust classifiers (Wong and Kolter,
2018; Gowal et al., 2018; Lecuyer et al., 2019; Li et al.,
2018; Cohen et al., 2019; Salman et al., 2019): in these
classifiers, for each image x, one can calculate a radius
ρ such that it is provably guaranteed that any other
image x˜ with distance less than ρ from x will be classi-
fied similarly to x. This means that no adversarial at-
tack can ever be developed which produces adversarial
examples to the classifier within the certified radius.
One effective approach to develop certifiably robust
classification is to use randomized smoothing with
a probabilistic robustness certificate (Lecuyer et al.,
2019; Li et al., 2018; Cohen et al., 2019; Salman et al.,
2019). In this approach, one uses a smoothed classifier
f¯(x), which represents the expectation of f(x) over
random perturbations of x. Based on this smoothing,
one can derive an upper bound on how steeply the
scores assigned to each class by f¯ can change, which
can then be used to derive a radius ρ in which the
highest class score must remain highest1.
In this work, we present the first certified de-
fence against Wasserstein adversarial attacks using an
adapted randomized smoothing approach, which we
call Wasserstein smoothing. To develop the robust-
ness certificate, we define a (non-unique) representa-
tion of the difference between two images, based on the
flow of pixel intensity necessary to construct one im-
1In practice, samples are used to estimate the expectation
f¯(x), producing an empirical smoothed classifier f˜(x):
the certification is therefore probabilistic, with a degree
of certainty dependent on the number of samples.
age from another. In this representation, we show that
the L1 norm of the minimal flow between two images is
equal to the Wasserstein distance between the images.
This allows us to apply existing L1 smoothing-based
defences, by adding noise in the space of these rep-
resentations of flows. We show that empirically that
this gives improved robustness certificates, compared
to using a weak upper bound of Wasserstein distance
given by randomized smoothing in the feature space
of images directly. We also show that our Wasser-
stein smoothing defence protects against Wasserstein
adversarial attacks empirically, with significantly im-
proved robustness compared to baseline models. For
small adversarial perturbations on the MNIST dataset,
our method achieves higher accuracy under adversar-
ial attack than all existing practical defences for the
Wasserstein threat model.
In summary, we make the following contributions:
• We develop a novel certified defence for the
Wasserstein adversarial attack threat model. This
is the first certified defence, to our knowledge,
that has been proposed for this threat model.
• We demonstrate that our certificate is nonvacu-
ous, in that it can certify Wasserstein radii larger
than those which can be certified by exploiting a
trivial L1 upper bound on Wasserstein distance.
• We demonstrate that our defence effectively pro-
tects against existing Wasserstein adversarial at-
tacks, compared to an unprotected baseline.
2 Background
Let x ∈ [0,1]n×m denote a two dimensional image, of
height n and width m. We will normalize the image
such that ∑i∑j xi,j = 1, so that x can be interpreted
as a probability distribution on the discrete support of
pixel coordinates of the two-dimensional image.2 Fol-
lowing the notation of Wong et al. (2019), we define
the p-Wasserstein distance between x and x′ as:
Definition 2.1. Given two distributions x,x′ ∈[0,1]n×m, and a distance metric d ∈ ([n]×[m])×([n]×[m])→ R , the p-Wasserstein distance as:
Wp(x,x′) = min
Π∈R(n⋅m)×(n⋅m)+ < Π,C >, (1)
Π1 = x, ΠT1 = x′,
C(i,j),(i′,j′) ∶= [d ((i, j), (i′, j′))]p .
2In the case of multi-channel color images, the attack pro-
posed by Wong et al. (2019) does not transport pixel in-
tensity between channels. This allows us to defend against
these attacks using our 2D Wasserstein smoothing with
little modification. See Section 6.3, and Corollary 2 in
the appendix
C(i,j),(i′,j′) is the cost of transporting a mass unit from
the position (i, j) to (i′, j′) in the image.
Note that, for the purpose of matrix multiplication, we
are treating x,x′ as vectors of length nm. Similarly,
the transport plan matrix Π and the cost matrix C are
in Rnm×nm.
Intuitively, Π(i,j),(i′,j′) represents the amount of prob-
ability mass to be transported from pixel (i, j) to(i′, j′), while C(i,j),(i′,j′) represents the cost per unit
probability mass to transport this probability. We can
choose d(., .) to be any measure of distance between
pixel positions in an image. For example, in order to
represent the L1 distance metric between pixel posi-
tions, we can choose:
d ((i, j), (i′, j′)) = ∣i − i′∣ + ∣j − j′∣. (2)
Moreover, to represent the L2 distance metric between
pixel positions, we can choose:
d ((i, j), (i′, j′)) = √(i − i′)2 + (j − j′)2. (3)
Our defence directly applies to the 1-Wasserstein met-
ric using the L1 distance as the metric d(., .), while the
attack developed by Wong et al. (2019) uses the L2 dis-
tance. However, because images are two dimensional,
these differ by at most a constant factor of
√
2, so
we adapt our certificates to the setting of Wong et al.
(2019) by simply scaling our certificates by 1/√2. All
experimental results will be presented with this scal-
ing. We emphasize that this it not the distinction be-
tween 1-Wasserstein and 2-Wasserstein distances: this
paper uses the 1-Wasserstein metric, to match the ma-
jority of the experimental results of Wong et al. (2019).
To develop our certificate, we rely an alternative linear
program formulation for the 1-Wasserstein distance on
a two-dimensional image with the L1 distance metric,
provided by Ling and Okada (2007):
W1(x,x′) = min
g
∑(i,j) ∑(i′,j′)∈N (i,j)g(i,j),(i′,j′) (4)
where g ≥ 0 and ∀(i, j),
∑(i′,j′)∈N (i,j)g(i,j),(i′,j′) − g(i′,j′),(i,j) = x′i,j − xi,j
Here, N (i, j) denotes the (up to) four immediate (non-
diagonal) neighbors of the position (i, j); in other
words, N (i, j) = {(i′, j′) ∣ ∣i − i′∣ + ∣j − j′∣ = 1}. For
the L1 distance in two dimensions, Ling and Okada
(2007) prove that this formulation is in fact equivalent
to the linear program given in Equation 1. Note that
only elements of g with ∣i − i′∣ + ∣j − j′∣ = 1 need to be
defined: this means that the number of variables in
the linear program is approximately 4nm, compared
to the n2m2 elements of Π in Equation 1. While this
was originally used to make the linear program more
tractable to be solved directly, we exploit the form of
this linear program to devise a randomized smoothing
scheme in the next section.
3 Robustness Certificate
In order to present our robustness certificate, we
first introduce some notation. Let δ = {δvert. ∈
R(n−1)×m,δhoriz. ∈ Rn×(m−1)} denote a local flow plan.
It specifies a net flow between adjacent pixels in an
image x, which, when applied, transforms x to a new
image x′. See Figure 2 for an explanation of the
indexing. For compactness, we write δ ∈ Rr where
r = (n − 1)m + n(m − 1) ≈ 2nm, and in general refer to
the space of possible local flow plans as the flow do-
main. We define the function ∆, which applies a local
flow to a distribution.
Definition 3.1. The local flow plan application func-
tion ∆ ∈ Rn×m × Rr → Rn×m is defined as:
∆(x,δ)i,j = xi,j + δvert.i−1,j − δvert.i,j + δhoriz.i,j−1 − δhoriz.i,j (5)
where we let δvert.0,j = δvert.n,j = δhoriz.i,0 = δhoriz.i,m = 0.3
Note that local flow plans are additive:
∆(∆(x,δ),δ′) = ∆(x,δ + δ′) (6)
Using this notation, we make a simple transformation
of the linear program given in Equation 4, removing
the positivity constraint from the variables and reduc-
ing the number of variables to ∼ 2nm:
Lemma 1. For any normalized probability distribu-
tions x,x′ ∈ [0,1]n×m:
W1(x,x′) = min
δ∶ x′=∆(x,δ) ∥δ∥1 (7)
where W1 denotes the 1-Wasserstein metric, using the
L1 distance as the underlying distance metric d.
In other words, we can upper-bound the Wasserstein
distance between two images using the L1 norm of any
feasible local flow plan between the two images. This
enables us to extend existing results for L1 smoothing-
based certificates (Lecuyer et al., 2019) to the Wasser-
stein metric, by adding noise in the flow domain.
Definition 3.2. We denote by L(σ) = Laplace(0, σ)r
as the Laplace noise with parameter σ in the flow do-
main of dimension r.
3Note that the new image x′ = ∆(x,δ) is not necessarily
a probability distribution because it may have negative
components. However, note that normalization is pre-
served: ∑i∑j x′i,j = 1. This is because every component
of δ is added once and subtracted once to elements in x.
Figure 2: Indexing of the elements of the local flow
map δ, in relation to the pixels of the image x, with
n=m=3.
Given a classification score function f ∶ Rn×m → [0,1]k,
we define f¯ as the Wasserstein-smoothed classification
function as follows:
f¯ = E
δ∼L(σ) [f(∆(x,δ))] . (8)
Let i be the class assignment of x using the
Wasserstein-smoothed classifier f¯ (i.e. i =
arg maxi′ f¯i′(x)).
Theorem 1. For any normalized probability distribu-
tion x ∈ [0,1]n×m, if
f¯i(x) ≥ e2√2ρ/σ max
i′≠i f¯i′(x) (9)
then for any perturbed probability distribution x˜ such
that W1(x, x˜) ≤ ρ, we have:
f¯i(x˜) ≥ max
i′≠i f¯i′(x˜). (10)
All proofs are presented in the appendix.
4 Intuition: One-Dimensional Case
To provide an intuition about the proposed Wasser-
stein smoothing certified robustness scheme, we con-
sider a simplified model, in which the support of x
is a one-dimensional array of length n, rather than
a two-dimensional grid (i.e. x ∈ Rn). In this case,
we can denote a local flow plan δ ∈ Rn−1, so that for
x′ = ∆(x,δ):
x′i = xi + δi−1 − δi (11)
where δ0 = δn = 0. In this one-dimensional case, for
any fixed x,x′ (with the normalization constraint that
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Figure 3: An illustrative example in one dimension.
r (black) denotes a fixed reference distribution. With
this starting distribution fixed, x (red) and x˜ (blue)
can both be uniquely represented in the flow domain
as δx and δx˜. Note that the Wasserstein distance be-
tween x and x˜ is then equivalent to the L1 distance
between δx and δx˜. In the one-dimensional case, this
shows that we can transform the samples into a space
where the Wasserstein threat model is equivalent to
the L1 metric. We can then use a pre-existing L1 cer-
tified defence in the flow space to defend our classifier.
∑i xi = ∑i x′i = 1), there is a unique solution δ to x′ =
∆(x,δ):
δi = i∑
j=1xj − i∑j=1x′j (12)
Note at this reminds us a well-known identity describ-
ing optimal transport between two distributions X,Y
which share a continuous, one-dimensional support
(see section 2.6 of Peyre´ et al. (2019), for example):
W1(X,Y ) = ∞∫−∞ ∣FX(z) − FY (z)∣dz (13)
where FX , FY denote cumulative density functions. If
we apply this result to our discretized case, with the
index i taking the place of z, and apply the identity to
x and x′, this becomes:
W1(x,x′) = n∑
i=1
RRRRRRRRRRR
i∑
j=1xj − i∑j=1x′j
RRRRRRRRRRR =
n∑
i=1 ∣δi∣ = ∥δ∥1 (14)
By the uniqueness of the solution given in Equation
12, for any x, we can define δx as the solution to
x = ∆(r,δ), where r is an arbitrary fixed reference
distribution (e.g. suppose r1 = 1, ri = 0 for i ≠ 1).
Therefore, instead of operating on the images x, x˜ ∈ Rn
directly, we can equivalently operate on δx and δx˜ in
the flow domain instead. We will therefore define a
flow-domain version of our classifier f :
fflow(δ) ∶= f(∆(r,δ)). (15)
We will now perform classification entirely in the
flow-domain, by first calculating δx and then using
fflow(δx) as our classifier. Now, consider x and an ad-
versarial perturbation x˜, and let δ be the unique solu-
tion to x˜ = ∆(x,δ). By equation 14, ∥δ∥1 =W1(x, x˜).
Then:
x˜ = ∆(x,δ) = ∆(∆(r,δx),δ) = ∆(r,δx + δ) (16)
where the second equality is by equation 6. Moreover,
by the uniqueness of Equation 12, δx˜ = δx + δ, or
δx˜ − δx = δ. Therefore
∥δx˜ − δx∥1 =W1(x, x˜). (17)
In other words, if we classify in the flow-domain, us-
ing fflow, the L1 distance between point δ
x,δx˜ is the
Wasserstein distance between the distributions x and
x˜. Then, we can perform smoothing in the flow-
domain, and use the existing L1 robustness certificate
provided by Lecuyer et al. (2019), to certify robust-
ness. Extending this argument to two-dimensional im-
ages adds some complication: images can no longer be
represented uniquely in the flow domain, and the re-
lationship between L1 distance and the Wasserstein
distance is now an upper bound. Nevertheless, the
same conclusion still holds for 2D images as we state
in Theorem 1. Proofs for the two-dimensional case are
given in the appendix.
5 Practical Certification Scheme
To generate probabilistic robustness certificates from
randomly sampled evaluations of the base classifier f ,
we adapt the procedure outlined by Cohen et al. (2019)
for L2 certificates. We consider a hard smoothed clas-
sifier approach: we set fj(x) = 1 if the base classifier
selects class j at point x, and fj(x) = 0 otherwise.
We also use a stricter form of the condition given as
Equation 9:
f¯i(x) ≥ e2√2ρ/σ(1 − f¯i(x)) (18)
This means that we only need to provide a probabilis-
tic lower bound of the expectation of the largest class
score, rather than bounding every class score. This
reduces the number of samples necessary to estimate
a high-confidence lower bound on f¯i(x), and therefore
to estimate the certificate with high confidence. Cohen
et al. (2019) provides a statistically sound procedure
for this, which we use: refer to that paper for details.
Note that, when simply evaluating the classification
given by f¯(x), we will also need to approximate f¯
using random samples. Cohen et al. (2019) also pro-
vides a method to do this which yields the expected
classification with high confidence, but may abstain
from classifying. We will also use this method when
evaluating accuracies.
Since the Wasserstein adversarial attack introduced
by Wong et al. (2019) uses the L2 distance metric,
to have a fair performance evaluation against this at-
tack, we are interested in certifying a radius in the 1-
Wasserstein distance with underlying L2 distance met-
ric, rather than L1. Let us denote this radius as ρ2. In
two-dimensional images, the elements of the cost ma-
trix C in this metric may be smaller by up to a factor
of
√
2, so we have:
ρ2 ≥ 1√
2
ρ (19)
Therefore, by certifying to a radius of ρ = √2ρ2, we can
effectively certify against the L2 metric 1-Wasserstein
attacks of radius ρ2; our condition then becomes:
f¯i(x) ≥ e4ρ2/σ(1 − f¯i(x)). (20)
6 Experimental Results
In all experiments, we use 10,000 random noised sam-
ples to predict the smoothed classification of each im-
age; to generate certificates, we first use 1000 sam-
ples to infer which class has highest smoothed score,
and then 10,000 samples to lower-bound this score.
All probabilistic certificates and classifications are re-
ported to 95% confidence. The model architectures
used for the base classifiers for each data set are the
same as used in Wong et al. (2019). When reporting
results, median certified accuracy refers to the maxi-
mum radius ρ2 such that at least 50% of classifications
for images in the data set are certified to be robust to
at least this radius, and these certificates are for the
correct ground truth class. If over 50% of images are
not certified for the correct class, this statistic is re-
ported as N/A.
6.1 Comparison to naive Laplace Smoothing
Note that one can derive a trivial but sometimes
tight bound, that, under any Lp distance metric, if
W1(x, x˜) ≤ ρ/2, then ∥x − x˜∥1 ≤ ρ. (See Corollary 1 in
Table 1 Certified Wasserstein Accuracy of Wasserstein and Laplace smoothing on MNIST
Noise Wasserstein Smoothing Wasserstein Smoothing Wasserstein Smoothing
standard deviation Classification accuracy Median certified Base Classifier
σ (Percent abstained) robustness Accuracy
0.005 98.71(00.04) 0.0101 97.94
0.01 97.98(00.19) 0.0132 94.95
0.02 93.99(00.58) 0.0095 79.72
0.05 74.22(03.95) 0 43.67
0.1 49.41(01.29) 0 30.26
0.2 31.80(08.40) N/A 25.13
0.5 22.58(00.84) N/A 22.67
Noise Laplace Smoothing Laplace Smoothing Laplace Smoothing
standard deviation Classification accuracy Median certified Base Classifier
σ (Percent abstained) robustness Accuracy
0.005 98.87(00.06) 0.0062 97.47
0.01 97.44(00.19) 0.0053 89.32
0.02 91.11(01.29) 0.0030 67.08
0.05 61.44(07.45) 0 33.80
0.1 34.92(09.36) N/A 25.56
0.2 24.02(05.67) N/A 22.85
0.5 22.57(01.05) N/A 22.70
the appendix.) This enables us to write a condition for
ρ2-radius Wasserstein certified robustness by applying
Laplace smoothing directly, and simply converting the
certificate. In our notation, this condition is:
f¯Laplacei (x) ≥ e4√2ρ2/σ(1 − f¯Laplacei (x)) (21)
where f¯Laplace(x) is a smoothed classifier with Laplace
noise added to every pixel independently. It may
appear as if our Wasserstein-smoothed bound should
only be an improvement over this bound by a factor
of
√
2 in the certified radius ρ2. However, as shown
in Table 1, we in fact improve our certificates by a
larger factor. This is because, for a fixed noise stan-
dard deviation, the base classifier is able to achieve a
higher accuracy after adding noise in the flow-domain,
compared to adding noise directly to the pixels. When
adding noise in the flow-domain, we add and subtract
noise in equal amounts between adjacent pixels, pre-
serving more information for the base classifier.
To give a concrete example, consider some k×k square
patch of an image. Suppose that the overall aggregate
pixel intensity in this patch (i.e. the sum of the pixel
values) is a salient feature for classification (This is a
highly plausible situation: for example, in MNIST, this
may indicate whether or not some region of an image is
occupied by part of a digit.) Let us call this feature µ,
and calculate the variance of µ in smoothing samples
under Laplace and Wasserstein smoothing, both with
variance σ2. Under Laplace smoothing (Figure 4-a),
k2 independent instances of Laplace noise are added
to µ, so the resulting variance will be k2σ2: this is
proportional to the area of the region. In the case of
Wasserstein smoothing, by contrast, probability mass
exchanged between between pixels in the interior of
the patch has no effect on the aggregate quantity µ.
Instead, only noise on the perimeter will affect the
total feature value µ: the variance is therefore 4kσ2
(Figure 4-b). Wasserstein smoothing then reduces the
effective noise variance on the feature µ by a factor of
O(k).
6.2 Empirical adversarial accuracy
We measure the performance of our smoothed classi-
fier against the Wasserstein-metric adversarial attack
proposed in Wong et al. (2019), and compare to mod-
els tested in that work. Results are presented in Figure
5. For testing, we use the same attack parameters as
in Wong et al. (2019): the ’Standard” and ’Adversar-
ial Training’ results are therefore replications of the
experiments from that paper, using the publicly avail-
able code and pretrained models.
In order to attack our hard smoothed classifier, we
adapt the method proposed by Salman et al. (2019):
in particular, note that we cannot directly calculate
the gradient of the classification loss with respect to
the image for a hard smoothed classifier, because the
derivatives of the logits of the base classifier are not
propagated. Therefore, we must instead attack a soft
smooth classifier: we take the expectation over sam-
ples of the softmaxed logits of the base classifier, in-
stead of the final classification output. In each step of
the attack, we use 128 noised samples to estimate this
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(b) Wasserstein Smoothing
Figure 4: Schematic diagram showing the difference between Laplace and Wasserstein smoothing on the variance
of the aggregate pixel intensity in a square region, outlined in red. See the text of Section 6.1. In both figures,
pixels are represented as square tiles. In (a), noise on individual pixels is represented with circles, which are gray
if they do not contribute to the overall pixel intensity in the outlined region, but are cyan if they do contribute.
We see that the noise is proportional (in variance) to the area of the region. In (b), under Wasserstein smoothing,
noise is represented by arrows between pixels which exchange intensity. Again, these are gray if they do not
contribute to the overall pixel intensity in the outlined region, and cyan if they do contribute. Note that arrows
in the interior do not contribute to the aggregate intensity, because equal values are added and subtracted from
adjacent pixels. The noise is proportional (in variance) to the perimeter of the region. This provides a plausible
intuition as to why base classifiers, when given noisy images, classify with higher accuracy on Wasserstein
smoothed images compared to Laplace smoothed images, as seen empirically in Table 1.
gradient, as used in Salman et al. (2019).
In the attack proposed by Wong et al. (2019), the im-
ages are attacked over 200 iterations of projected gra-
dient descent, projected onto a Wasserstein ball, with
the radius of the ball every 10 iterations. The attack
succeeds, and the final radius is recorded, once the
classifier misclassifies the image. In order to preserve
as much of the structure (and code) of the attack as
possible to provide a fair comparison, it is thus nec-
essary for us to evaluate each image using our hard
classifier, with the full 10,000 smoothing samples, at
each iteration of the attack. We count the classifier
abstaining as a misclassification for these experiments.
However, note that this may somewhat underestimate
the true robustness of our classifier: recall that our
classifier is nondeterministic; therefore, because we
are repeatedly evaluating the classifier and reporting
a perturbed image as adversarial the first time it is
missclassified, we may tend to over-count misclassifi-
cations. However, because we are using a large number
of noise samples to generate our classifications, this is
only likely to happen with examples which are close to
being adversarial. Still, the presented data should be
regarded as a lower bound on the true accuracy under
attack of our Wasserstein smoothed classifier.
In Figure 5, we note two things: first, our Wasser-
stein smoothing technique appears to be an effective
empirical defence against Wasserstein adversarial at-
tacks, compared to an unprotected (’Standard’) net-
work. (It is also more robust than the binarized and
L∞-robust models tested by Wong et al. (2019): see
appendix.) However, for large perturbations, our de-
fence is less effective than the adversarial training de-
fence proposed by Wong et al. (2019). This suggests
a promising direction for future work: Salman et al.
(2019) proposed an adversarial training method for
smoothed classifiers, which could be applied in this
case. Note however that both Wasserstein adversarial
attacks and smoothed adversarial training are com-
putationally expensive, so this may require significant
Table 2 Certified Wasserstein Accuracy of Wasserstein smoothing on CIFAR10
Noise standard deviation Classification accuracy Median certified Base Classifier
σ (Percent abstained) robustness Accuracy
0.00005 87.01(00.24) 0.000101 86.02
0.0001 83.39(00.42) 0.000179 82.08
0.0002 77.57(00.66) 0.000223 75.46
0.0005 68.75(01.01) 0.000209 65.12
0.001 61.65(01.77) 0.000127 57.03
Figure 5: Comparison of empirical robustness on
MNIST to models from (Wong et al., 2019). Wasser-
stein smoothing with σ = 0.01 (This is the amount of
noise which maximizes certified robustness, as seen in
Table 1.)
computational resources.
Second, the median radius of attack to which our
smoothed classifier is empirically robust is larger than
the median certified robustness of our smoothed clas-
sifier by two orders of magnitude. This calls for fu-
ture work both to develop improved robustness certifi-
cates as well as to develop more effective attacks in the
Wasserstein metric.
6.3 Experiments on color images (CIFAR-10)
Wong et al. (2019) also apply their attack to color
images in CIFAR-10. In this case, the attack does
not transport probability mass between color channels:
therefore, in our defence, it is sufficient to add noise
in the flow domain to each channel independently to
certify robustness (See Corollary 2 in the appendix for
a proof of the validity of this method). Certificates
are presented in Table 2, while empirical robustness
is as Figure 6. Again, we compare directly to models
from Wong et al. (2019). We note that again, empir-
ically, our model significantly outperforms an unpro-
tected model, but is not as robust as a model trained
adversarially. We also note that the certified robust-
Figure 6: Comparison of empirical robustness on
CIFAR-10 to models from (Wong et al., 2019). Wasser-
stein smoothing is with σ = 0.0002. (This is the
amount of noise which maximizes certified robustness,
as seen in Table 2.) Note that we test on a random
sample of 1000 images from CIFAR-10, rather than
the entire data set.
ness is orders of magnitude smaller than computed for
MNIST: however, the unprotected model is also sig-
nificantly less robust empirically than the equivalent
MNIST model.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we developed a smoothing-based certifi-
ably robust defence for Wasserstein-metric adversarial
examples. To do this, we add noise in the space of pos-
sible flows of pixel intensity between images. To our
knowledge, this is the first certified defence method
specifically tailored to the Wasserstein threat model.
Our method proves to be an effective practical defence
against Wasserstein adversarial attacks, with signifi-
cantly improved empirical adversarial robustness com-
pared to a baseline model.
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A Proofs
Lemma 1. For any normalized probability distribu-
tions x,x′ ∈ [0,1]n×m, there exists at least one δ such
that x′ = ∆(x,δ). Furthermore:
min
δ∶ x′=∆(x,δ) ∥δ∥1 =W1(x,x′) (22)
Where W1 denotes the 1-Wasserstein metric, using L1
distance as the underlying distance metric.
Proof. We first show the equivalence of the above min-
imization problem with the linear program proposed
by Ling and Okada (2007), restated here:
W1(x,x′) = min
g
∑(i,j) ∑(i′,j′)∈N ((i,j))g(i,j),(i′,j′) (23)
where g ≥ 0 and ∀(i, j),
∑(i′,j′)∈N ((i,j))g(i,j),(i′,j′) − g(i′,j′),(i,j) = x′i,j − xi,j
It suffices to show that (1) there is a transformation
from the variables g in Equation 23 to the variables δ
in Equation 22, such that all points which are feasible
in Equation 23 are feasible in 22 and the minimization
objective in Equation 22 is less than or equal to the
minimization objective in Equation 23, and (2) there
is a transformation from the variables δ in Equation 22
to the variables g in Equation 23, such that all points
which are feasible in Equation 22 are feasible in Equa-
tion 23 and the minimization objective in Equation 23
is less than or equal to the minimization objective in
Equation 22.
We start with (1). We give the transformation as:
δvert.i,j ∶= g(i,j),(i+1,j) − g(i+1,j),(i,j)
δhoriz.i,j ∶= g(i,j),(i,j+1) − g(i,j+1),(i,j) (24)
Where we let g(n,j),(n+1,j) = g(n+1,j),(n,j) =
g(i,m+1),(i,m) = g(i,m),(i,m+1) = 0. To show fea-
sibility, we write out fully the flow constraint of
Equation 23:
g(i,j),(i+1,j) − g(i+1,j),(i,j)+
g(i,j),(i−1,j) − g(i−1,j),(i,j)+
g(i,j),(i,j+1) − g(i,j+1),(i,j)+
g(i,j),(i,j−1) − g(i,j−1),(i,j) =x′i,j − xi,j
(25)
Substituting in Equation 24:
δvert.i,j + −δvert.i−1,j + δhoriz.i,j + −δhoriz.i,j−1 = x′i,j − xi,j (26)
But by Definition 3.1, this is exactly:
∆(x,δ)i,j = x′i,j (27)
Which is the sole constraint in Equation 22: then any
solution which is feasible in Equation 23 is feasible in
Equation 22. Also note that:
∥δ∥1 =∑
i,j
∣δvert.i,j ∣ + ∣δhoriz.i,j ∣
≤∑
i,j
∣g(i,j),(i+1,j)∣ + ∣g(i+1,j),(i,j)∣
+ ∣g(i,j),(i,j+1)∣ + ∣g(i,j+1),(i,j)∣=∑
i,j
g(i,j),(i+1,j) + g(i+1,j),(i,j)
+ g(i,j),(i,j+1) + g(i,j+1),(i,j)=∑
i,j
g(i,j),(i+1,j) + g(i,j),(i,j+1)
+∑
i,j
g(i+1,j),(i,j) + g(i,j+1),(i,j)
=∑
i,j
g(i,j),(i+1,j) + g(i,j),(i,j+1)
+∑
i,j
g(i,j),(i−1,j) + g(i,j),(i,j−1)
= ∑(i,j) ∑(i′,j′)∈N ((i,j))g(i,j),(i′,j′)
(28)
Where the inequality follows from triangle inequality
applied to Equation 24, and in the second sum in the
fourth line, we exploit the fact that g(n,j),(n+1,j) =
g(n+1,j),(n,j) = g(i,m+1),(i,m) = g(i,m),(i,m+1) = 0 to shift
indices. This shows that the minimization objective in
Equation 22 is less than or equal to the minimization
objective in Equation 23.
Moving on to (2), we give the transformation as:
g(i,j),(i+1,j) ∶= max(δvert.i,j ,0)
g(i,j),(i−1,j) ∶= max(−δvert.i−1,j ,0)
g(i,j),(i,j+1) ∶= max(δhoriz.i,j ,0)
g(i,j),(i,j−1) ∶= max(−δhoriz.i,j−1 ,0)
(29)
Note that the non-negativity constraint of Equation
23 is automatically satisfied by the form of these defi-
nitions. Shifting indices, we also have:
g(i−1,j),(i,j) = max(δvert.i−1,j ,0)
g(i+1,j),(i,j) = max(−δvert.i,j ,0)
g(i,j−1),(i,j) = max(δhoriz.i,j−1 ,0)
g(i,j+1),(i,j) = max(−δhoriz.i,j ,0)
(30)
From the constraint on Equation 22, we have:
x′i,j − xi,j =δvert.i,j +− δvert.i−1,j+
δhoriz.i,j +− δhoriz.i,j−1=max(δvert.i,j ,0) −max(−δvert.i,j ,0)+
max(−δvert.i−1,j −max(δvert.i−1,j ,0),0)+
max(δhoriz.i,j ,0) −max(−δhoriz.i,j ,0)+
max(−δhoriz.i,j−1 ,0) −max(δhoriz.i,j−1 ,0)=g(i,j),(i+1,j) − g(i+1,j),(i,j)+
g(i,j),(i−1,j) − g(i−1,j),(i,j)+
g(i,j),(i,j+1) − g(i,j+1),(i,j)+
g(i,j),(i,j−1) − g(i,j−1),(i,j)
(31)
Which is exactly the second constraint of Equation 23:
then any solution which is feasible in Equation 23 is
feasible in Equation 22. Also note that:
∑(i,j) ∑(i′,j′)∈N ((i,j))g(i,j),(i′,j′)=∑
i,j
g(i,j),(i+1,j) + g(i,j),(i,j+1)
+∑
i,j
g(i,j),(i−1,j) + g(i,j),(i,j−1)
=∑
i,j
max(δvert.i,j ,0) +max(δhoriz.i,j ,0)
+∑
i,j
max(−δvert.i−1,j ,0) +max(−δhoriz.i,j−1 ,0)
=∑
i,j
max(δvert.i,j ,0) +max(−δvert.i,j ,0)
+∑
i,j
max(δhoriz.i,j ,0) +max(−δhoriz.i,j ,0)
=∑
i,j
∣δvert.i,j ∣ + ∣δhoriz.i,j ∣
=∥δ∥1
(32)
Where we again exploit the fact that g(n,j),(n+1,j) =
g(n+1,j),(n,j) = g(i,m+1),(i,m) = g(i,m),(i,m+1) = 0 to shift
indices, in the fourth line. This shows that the mini-
mization objective in Equation 23 is less than or equal
to the minimization objective in Equation 22, complet-
ing (2).
Finally, now that we have shown that Equations 22
and 23 are in fact equivalent minimizations (i.e., we
have proven Equation 22 correct), we would like to
show that there is always a feasible solution to 22, as
claimed. By the above transformations, it suffices to
show that there is always a feasible solution to Equa-
tion 23. Ling and Okada (2007) show that any feasible
solution the the general Wasserstein minimization LP
(Definition 1) can be transformed into a solution to
Equation 23, so it suffices to show that the LP in Defi-
nition 1 always has a feasible solution. This is trivially
satisfied by taking Π = x(x′)T , where we note that x,
a probability distribution, is non-negative.
Theorem 1. Consider a normalized probability distri-
bution x ∈ [0,1]n×m, and a classification score function
f ∶ Rn×m → [0,1]k. Let f¯ refer to the Wasserstein-
smoothed classification function:
f¯(x) = E
δ∼L(σ) [f(∆(x,δ))] (33)
Let i be the class assignment of x using the smoothed
classifier f¯ (i.e. i = arg maxi′ f¯i′(x)). If
f¯i(x) ≥ e2√2ρ/σ max
i′≠i f¯i′(x) (34)
Then for any perturbed probability distribution x˜ such
that W1(x, x˜) ≤ ρ:
f¯i(x˜) ≥ max
i′≠i f¯i′(x˜) (35)
Proof. Let u be the uniform probability vector. As a
consequence of Lemma 1, for any distribution x, there
exists a nonempty set of local flow plans Sx:
Sx = {δ∣x = ∆(u,δ)} (36)
Also, we may define a version of the classifier f on the
local flow plan domain:
fflow(δ) = f(∆(u,δ)) (37)
Let δx be an arbitrary element in Sx, and consider any
perturbed x˜ such that W1(x, x˜) ≤ ρ. By Theorem 1:
min
δ∶ x˜=∆(x,δ) ∥δ∥1 =W1(x, x˜) (38)
Then, using Equation 6:
min
δ∶ x˜=∆(u,δx+δ) ∥δ∥1 =W1(x, x˜) (39)
Let the minimum be achieved at δ∗. Making a change
of variables (δx˜ = δ∗ + δx), we have:
∥δx˜ − δx∥1 =W1(x, x˜) where x˜ = ∆(u,δx˜) (40)
Note that for any x′ (for δ′ ∼ L(σ)) :
f¯(x′) =E [f(∆(x′,δ′)]=E [f(∆(u,δx′ + δ′))]=E [fflow(δx′ + δ′))] (41)
We can now apply Proposition 1 from Lecuyer et al.
(2019), restated here:
Proposition. Consider a vector v ∈ Rd, and a clas-
sification score function h ∶ Rd → [0,1]k. Let  ∼
Laplace(0, σ)d, and let i be the class assignment of v
using a Laplace-smoothed version of the classifier h:
i = arg max
i′ E [hi′(v + )] (42)
If:
E

[hi(v + )] ≥ e2√2ρ/σ max
i′≠i E [hi′(v + )] (43)
Then for any perturbed probability distribution v˜ such
that ∥v − v˜∥1 ≤ ρ:
E

[hi(v˜ + )] ≥ max
i′≠i E [hi′(v˜ + )] (44)
We apply this proposition to fflow, noting that ∥δx˜ −
δx∥1 =W1(x, x˜) ≤ ρ:
E
δ′ [fflowi (δx + δ′))] ≥ e2√2ρ/σ maxi′≠i Eδ′ [fflowi′ (δx + δ′))]Ô⇒ E
δ′ [fflowi (δx˜ + δ′))] ≥ maxi′≠i Eδ′ [fflowi′ (δx˜ + δ′))]
(45)
Then, using Equation 41:
f¯i(x) ≥ e2√2ρ/σ max
i′≠i f¯i′(x) Ô⇒
f¯i(x˜) ≥ max
i′≠i f¯i′(x˜) (46)
Which was to be proven.
Corollary 1. For any normalized probability distri-
butions x,x′ ∈ [0,1]n×m, if W1(x,x′) ≤ ρ/2, then∥x − x′∥1 ≤ ρ, where W1 is the 1-Wasserstein metric
using any Lp norm as the underlying distance metric.
Furthermore, there exist distributions where these in-
equalities are tight.
Proof. Let Π indicate the optimal transport plan be-
tween x and x′. From Definition 1, we have Π1 = x
and ΠT1 = x′. Then:(ΠT −Π)1 = x′ −x (47)
Let Π′ represent a modified version of Π, with the
diagonal elements set to zero. Note that < Π′,C >=<
Π,C > and ΠT −Π = (Π′)T −Π′. Then, using triangle
inequality: ∥(Π′)T1∥1 + ∥(Π′)1∥1≥∥((Π′)T −Π′)1∥1=∥x′ −x∥1 (48)
Because the elements of Π′ are non-negative, this is
simply:
2∑
i,j
Π′i,j ≥ ∥((Π′)T −Π′)1∥1 = ∥x′ −x∥1 (49)
Then, because the (non-diagonal) elements of C are at
least 1 for any Lp norm, we have,
2 < Π′,C >≥ 2∑
i,j
Π′i,j ≥ ∥x′ −x∥1 (50)
Because < Π′,C >=< Π,C >= W1(x,x′), this means
that ∥x′ − x∥1 ≤ 2W1(x,x′) ≤ ρ, which was to be
proven. Note that this inequality can be tight. For
example, let x be the distribution where the entire
probability mass is at position (i, j), and x′ be the
distribution where the probability mass is equally split
between at positions (i, j) and (i + 1, j). (In other
words, x(i,j) = 1,x′(i,j) = .5,x′(i+1,j) = .5). In this case,∥x′ −x∥1 = 1, W1(x,x′) = .5.
Corollary 2. Consider a color image with three chan-
nels, denoted x = [xR,xG,xB], normalized such that∑(i,j) xR(i,j) + xG(i,j) + xB(i,j) = 1. Consider a perturbed
image x˜ such that ∀K ∈ {R,G,B}, ∑(i,j) xK(i,j) =∑(i,j) x˜K(i,j). Let W1(x, x˜) denote the 1-Wasserstein
distance (with L1 distance metric) between x and x˜,
where, when determining the minimum transport plan,
transport between channels is not permitted. Using this
definition, let W1(x, x˜) ≤ ρ. Define:
δ = {δR,δG,δB}
∆(x,δ) = {∆(xR,δR),∆(xG,δG),∆(xB ,δB)} (51)
and let Lcolor(σ) represent independent draws of
Laplace noise each with standard deviation σ in the
shape of δ. Then if
f¯i(x) ≥ e2√2ρ/σ max
i′≠i f¯i′(x) (52)
then
f¯i(x˜) ≥ max
i′≠i f¯i′(x˜). (53)
Proof. Let the mass in each channel be denoted sK :
sK ∶= ∑(i,j)xK(i,j) = ∑(i,j) x˜K(i,j) (54)
Consider the formulation of Wasserstein distance given
in Definition 1. If we represent the elements of x as
a vector by concatenating the elements of δR,δG, and
δB , then the restriction that there is no flow between
channels amounts to the requirement that Π is block-
diagonal:
Π = ⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
ΠR 0 0
0 ΠG 0
0 0 ΠB
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦ (55)
Let C1,1 represent the standard cost matrix for 1-
Wasserstein transport (with L1 distance metric). Be-
cause the cost of transport within each channel is the
same for standard 1-Wasserstein transport (with L1
distance metric), we have:
C = ⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
C1,1 0 0
0 C1,1 0
0 0 C1,1
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦ (56)
Then we have:< Π,C >=< ΠR,C1,1 > + < ΠG,C1,1 > + < ΠB ,C1,1 >
(57)
And by Equation 55, the constraints also factorize out:
ΠR1 = xR, (ΠR)T1 = x˜R,
ΠB1 = xB , (ΠB)T1 = x˜B ,
ΠG1 = xG, (ΠG)T1 = x˜G (58)
Then the variables of each ΠK are separable (in that
they appear together in the objective only in the sum
and share no constraints). We can then factorize the
minimization:
W1(x, x˜) =∑
K
min
ΠK∈R(n⋅m)×(n⋅m)+ < ΠK ,C(1,1) >, (59)∀K, ΠK1 = xK , (ΠK)T1 = x˜K (60)
(61)
We can transform each xK into a normalized probabil-
ity distribution by scaling it by a factor of 1/sK . We
similarly scale each ΠK :
xKsc. ∶= xKsK ΠKsc. ∶= ΠKsK (62)
Then we have:
W1(x, x˜) =∑
K
sK ⋅ min
ΠKsc.∈R(n⋅m)×(n⋅m)+ < ΠKsc.,C(1,1) >,
(63)∀K, ΠKsc.1 = xKsc., (ΠKsc.)T1 = x˜Ksc. (64)
(65)
But note that this is simply:
W1(x, x˜) =∑
K
sK ⋅W1(xKsc., x˜Ksc.) (66)
By Lemma 1, this is:
W1(x, x˜) =∑
K
sK ⋅ min
δKsc.∶ x˜Ksc.=∆(xKsc.,δKsc.) ∥δKsc.∥1 (67)
By the linearity to scaling of ∆ and the L1 norm, this
is simply:
W1(x, x˜) =∑
K
min
δK ∶ x˜K=∆(xK ,δK) ∥δK∥1 (68)
Which, by Equation 51, is simply,
W1(x, x˜) = min
δ∶ x˜=∆(x,δ) ∥δ∥1 (69)
Then all of the mechanics of the proof of Theorem 1
apply, and (avoiding unnecessary repetition), we con-
clude the result.
B Comparison to other Defences in
Wong et al. (2019)
Figure 7: Comparison of empirical robustness on
MNIST to additional defences from (Wong et al.,
2019), other than adversarial training. Randomized
Smoothing shown here is Wasserstein smoothing with
σ = 0.01. (This is the amount of noise which maximizes
certified robustness, as seen in Table 1.)
In addition to proposing adversarial training as a de-
fence against Wasserstein Adversarial attacks, Wong
et al. (2019) also tests other defences. On MNIST, bi-
narization of the input and using a provably L∞-robust
classifier were also tested as defences: our random-
ized smoothing method is more effective than these
methods at all attack magnitudes (see Figure 7). On
CIFAR-10, Wong et al. (2019) only tested a provably
L∞-robust classifier as an additional defence: unfor-
tunately, code was not provided for this model, so we
did not attempt to replicate the results.
C Training Parameters
In this paper, network architectures models used were
identical to those used in Wong et al. (2019). Unless
stated otherwise, all parameters of attacks are the
same as used in that paper for each data set. For
training smoothed models, we train the base classifier
using standard cross-entropy loss on individual noised
sample images, using the same noise distribution
as used when performing smoothed classification.
However, during training, rather than using the same
image repeatedly while adding different noise (as at
test time), we instead train with each image only
once per epoch, with one noise draw. In fact, for
computational efficiency and as suggested by Lecuyer
et al. (2019), we re-use the same noise for each image
in a batch. Training parameters are as follows (Tables
3, 4):
Table 3 Training Parameters for MNIST Experiments
Training Epochs 200
Batch Size 128
Optimizer Stochastic Gradient
Descent with Momentum
Learning Rate .001
Momentum 0.9
L2 Weight Penalty 0.0005
Table 4 Training Parameters for CIFAR-10 Experi-
ments
Training Epochs 200
Batch Size 128
Training Set Normalization,
Preprocessing Random Cropping (Padding:4)
and Random Horizontal Flip
Optimizer Stochastic Gradient
Descent with Momentum
Learning Rate .01 (Epochs 1-200)
.001 (Epochs 201-400)
Momentum 0.9
L2 Weight Penalty 0.0005
.
